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Abstract 
The research is devoted to determining conditions of Serbian development in the period of 
regency in 1889-1893 and the Russian society reaction to these events. Milan Obrenovich's 
renunciation of throne and the transition of power into the hands of radical party led by N. Pashich 
marked approach of a new stage in the Serbian kingdom foreign policy. In particular, in the speech 
read by Pashich at the meeting of Skupstina it was said that "new precious acquisitions" in the field 
of diplomatic relations, and the reciprocal address of Skupstina directly indicated renewal of 
friendship with Russia.  
In general, "peaceful coup d'etat" in Serbia, contrary to approvals of the Russian patriotic 
editions, which were laying great hopes on radicals, did not mean that the "younger of all of the 
European kingdoms" would turn towards Russia, and did not cause any sharp changes in position 
of Serbia, though in the Serbian-Russian relations a certain "thaw" was observed. Numerous 
Austro-Hungarian statements of respect for the independence of the Balkan states concerning 
Serbia almost immediately gave way to the traditional pressure applied in two directions: 
intervention into Serbian internal affairs and foreign policy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays there is a limited number of researches devoted to the problem of internal [1; 2] 
and foreign political [3] groups struggle to influence the Serbian monarch and Skupstina on the 
verge of the 19-20th centuries. In this regard opposition of Vienna and St. Petersburg for the Balkan 
Peninsula influence spheres presents itself important. Even today the subject does not lose relevance 
in the light of the West and the East countries opposition, and leaves a question of the executive 
authority and legislature influence responsibility degree on the state and society open. The purpose 
of the current research was to track dynamics of the Russian social thought reflecting political life 
in Serbia during the Regency period (1889-1893). 
In this event the Russian public saw the sign of important changes in foreign political 
position of Serbia in sense of its release from the Austro-Hungary excessive "guardianship". The 
revolution peacefully held in Serbia could not be left without "important consequences", not only 
concerning the fate of the "younger of the European kingdoms" (i.e. Serbia), but also for destinies 
of other Balkan Peninsula states [7]. 
However, in assessment of the bilateral relations future development views differed. The 
conservative part of the Russian society representatives  believed that the "true narodolyubets 
(people-carers)", "advocates of political and civil identity of the fatherland" who came to power, 
would manage to appreciate "the blessings rendered by great Russia to its Balkan brothers in faith" 
[8] and would give the Belgrade foreign policy  the corresponding "original" direction based an "a 
close, blood and spiritual bond of Serbians and Russians", on "the firm ground of mutual state 
interests" [7]. More rational representatives of the Russian society were skeptical, believing that it 
"would be hasty to conclude that Serbia, being exempted from one guardianship, would thereby 
seek to replace it with another". 
Perhaps, most drastic changes in relationships system with Austro-Hungary took place, the 
Balkan Peninsula policy and establishment of the new government in Serbia delivered a serious 
blow to these relationships. Skupstina, assembled at the beginning of October, 1890 consisted 
mainly of radicals, who acted as resolute opponents to Austro-filiacy and foreign diplomatic 
guardianship of any kind. Therefore became obvious that unilateral domination of the Austrian 
influence had to stop on its own. 
The results demonstrating influence of the political, cultural and mental processes taking 
place in Serbia on the verge of the 19-20th centuries directed to eliminate the most serious obstacles 
on the way of normal state development are an important research subject and, thus, are presented 
in the article [4]. 
The most important milestones of the Balkans political life at the end of the XIX century are 
reflected in the article. Article data can be useful in researches of the Eastern Europe institutional 
history, as well as in modern public discussions about extent of political influence on institutes of 
power, development and dynamics of the young states political life. 
 
METHODS 
The key method to researching this problem is the history-and-system method on the basis 
of historical sources allowing understanding laws of Serbian social and political system functioning 
against influence of regents who served as a peculiar counterbalance to the radicals relying on the 
majority in Skupstina. It allows to reveal groups of influence on the Serbian monarch and to 
respectively define further development of political and social system of the state. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSIONS 
On February 22, 1889 the king of Serbia Milan Obrenovich abdicated in favor of his 12-
year-old son Alexander Obrenovich [5]. Until his coming into age the power had to belong to the 
Regent council led by Y.Ristich, with participation of generals Protich and Belimarkovich. After 
this the Serbian radical party led by N. Pashich won a convincing victory in parliamentary elections 
that caused foreign policy reorientation of Serbia towards Russia. 
The solemnity and celebration scale of the Kosovo field battle 500-year anniversary for 
which Alexander Obrenovich's crowning was dated (June 28, 1889) showed the new direction in the 
foreign policy [9]. 
In Serbia influence of Austro-Hungary was carried out by means of regents who served as a 
peculiar counterbalance to the radicals relying on the Skupstina majority and braked their efforts "to 
bring the young Kingdom on the way of independence" [10]. It was also greatly promoted by the 
subsequently appointed Austro-Hungarian envoy to the Serbian court, general Temmes, who urged 
to reconstruct the party devoted to the Gabsburg monarchy. 
In the speech at the opening of the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments delegations meeting 
the emperor Franz Joseph, having mentioned the formal assurance of friendship observance with 
Austro-Hungary received from regents, let know that "non-compliance with this promise threatens 
Serbia with serious danger" [11]. However, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs count 
G. Kalnoki had other point of view, believing that "abolition of barriers constraining them (political 
passions) and strains" cannot be regarded as an occasion to immediate implementation of "the 
certain fantastic ideas and dreams emerged on the surface" [10] and suggested to wait whether 
regents would fulfill liability to keep the system of relations with the two-uniform monarchy 
installed by the King M. Obrenovich assumed by them in the invariance.  
Belgrade realized importance of "material prosperity" without which it was impossible to 
come to fuller political independence from Vienna. Therefore the government of radicals led by S. 
Gruich with assistance of Skupstina [6] held a number of means concerning the internal political 
relations, economy, finance, education, army and church affairs. They were directed to eliminate the 
most serious obstacles on the way to normal state development of Serbia, first of all, on achieving 
financial and economic independence of the country from the foreign investments. In this context it 
is necessary to consider actions of the Serbian government which rigidly arrived with the French 
railway company – it simply nationalized the road, having compensated financial claims of "the 
interested investments" [14]. The same scenario was applied to salt monopoly of the Anglo-
Austrian bank, despite the signed 8-year contract and fuss made by the Austrian press about it. As 
well as in the first case, business had to end with several million payment to the bank, according to 
an initial government proposal. As it was emphasized in the Russian press "development of Serbia's 
internal peace is no longer delayed by the aimless and ruinous game of "the high policy", the 
constant political intrigues absorbing king Milan; the country is little by little freed from the 
financial fetters imposed on it" [12]. 
On the foreign policy arena in the period of Regency Serbia maintained equal relations with 
all European states, expansion in "the ethnographic direction" remained business of the uncertain 
future. Nevertheless, Belgrade got strong "disgrace" "from all Balkan states", from Germany and 
Austro-Hungary [14]. The vigorous actions of the Serbian government creating certain economic 
"isolation" of the country which developed finally into open fight against Austro-Hungary were one 
of the reasons for it, according to contemporaries. 
The two-uniform monarchy applied a proven means – the economic pressure expressed in "a 
pork question". After the angry threat of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Kalnoki about applying 
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"vigorous measures" to Serbia, the order of the Hungarian minister of agriculture about prohibition 
of pigs transportation from Serbia to Hungary under the pretext of epidemic which burst out there, 
followed. The purpose of this economic war which had "purely political lining" was clear: export of 
cattle, mainly pigs, through the Hungarian border was a principal object of the Serbian export and 
brought to the Serbian treasury, according to contemporaries, about 15 million rubles silver that 
made a third of the total annual income. The ban of evacuation of pigs caused Serbia the enormous 
loss close to ruin, and had to incline it to concessions. 
However this time the Serbian government showed hardness and answered with return of 
many Austrian and Hungarian goods. When the ban of export touched the Serbian skin and bread, 
the Serbian businessmen stopped any relations with Austro-Hungarian manufacturers and directed 
export of bread bypassing the two-uniform monarchy, through Thessaloniki. Thus, radical measures 
were planned to be taken also for permission of "a pork question": near Belgrade construction of 
slaughterhouses and a plant for pickling and smoking of 300 thousand pigs a year which was 
supposed to be delivered to Europe through Thessaloniki, was planned. This extremely favorable 
project also interested other European countries, Italy in particular. 
Active repulse from Serbia, as well as protests from the Austrian and German manufacturers 
sustaining losses compelled the Austro-Hungarian government, without lifting the official ban, to 
make some concessions. At the same time it was included into the agreement with the baron Girsh 
to sell the railroad to Thessaloniki belonging to him, to make the Serbian export there impossible. 
Belgrade also took measures and entered negotiations with certain "rich salonikets" of Hamdi-bei: 
the last undertook large-scale works on regulation of the river on all extent as the acquired Austria 
of the railroad going on the coast of this river Vardar. Thus, Serbia, by means of considerable 
subsidies investment intended to accelerate works on establishing the new and more convenient 
way to Thessaloniki bypassing the Austrian railroad. 
According to messages of the Russian contemporaries, if Serbia "continues to work with 
present energy and reasonable patriotism", then its undertakings would terminate in probable good 
luck, especially as Germany disapprovingly treated a new phase of Austro-Hungarian policy for 
Serbia [15]. 
Contemporaries noted that "business will not do without fight" which "will decide dispute 
between the historical and national course and efforts of Central European diplomacy to include 
Serbia in the sphere of power of the Austro-Magyar empire" [16]. 
The ex-king Milan Obrenovich whose uncertain status and unresolved family affairs made 
considerable part of "the Serbian question" remained the conductor of the Austrian influence. Most 
distinctly influence of "the Austro-German intrigue" was shown during family crisis in the Serbian 
ruling dynasty which deification fell on the Regency period. The persistent fight of the queen 
Natalia for the right of education and primary influence on the young king Alexander interfaced 
with her need to return to Serbia became a subject of foreign policy manipulations. It caused 
counteraction from Milan Obrenovich and the Regent council in the person Y. Ristich. As a result, 
after the short period of return, Natalia Obrenovich, according to the decision of Skupstina, was 
deprived of the right to enter Serbia until Alexander's coming of age and forced to leave the 
country. 
This conflict which directly involving Austro-Hungary and Germany, and indirectly – the 
European public, did not affect Russia in practice. First, the Reykhshtadt agreement of 1876 and the 
Budapest convention of 1877 between Russia and Austro-Hungary according to which this part of 
the Balkans was considered as the sphere of Vienna primary interests remained in force. Second, 
internal political changes in Serbia coincided with revaluation of the role of Russia by the Russian 
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society in this region towards its further "concentration" and the appeal to own economic and 
economic needs. The policy on the Balkans with its traditional aspiration to Passages and protection 
the orthodox people did not answer time any more and was perceived by many as a historical 
anachronism. 
In this regard, despite general sympathy for the queen Natalia, the Russian public and 
political circles stood on position of non-interference into internal affairs of the Serbian kingdom 
and the most correct decision considered "to let them (Serbians) manage how they want", believing 
that it would rouse Serbia to "sympathy and gratitude for Russia for our freedom of inaction". 
"Since we ceased to strive on Serbians, their friendship returned little by little", - the Russian 
contemporaries noted [17]. 
This self-elimination of Russia, according to the opinion of contemporaries, was promoted 
by several factors in no small measure. Readiness of the Russian diplomacy "to remove their heat 
(Europe) by Russian hands" caused bewilderment and direct charges with "availability to foreign 
influences" even from conservative editions [11]. 
Lack of the firm foreign policy line led to existing in the Russian society of outdated 
Slavophiliac model of Serbia's perception on an equal basis with other states of the Balkan 
Peninsula as "younger brothers", without any changes happening. Orientation to Russia was 
perceived as "free and natural development of Serbia", "awakening of national consciousness" [11] 
to which Austro-Hungary encroached. 
On the other hand, the unpleasant deposit was left by ambiguous policy of the Regent Head 
Y.Ristich who in working hours of the Berlin congress dexterous maneuvred between Austro-
Hungary and Russia. "Nobody knows better than him that Serbia is obliged by everything to Russia 
alone, - wrote the Russian Review magazine, - and nobody can assure the Vienna diplomats better 
than him that Serbia will never forget blessings of Austria" [18]. 
Political "balancing act" of Y.Ristich and his ugly role in the conflict of the king Milan and 
the queen Natalia when he sided with the first "and did not spare efforts to humiliate, offend the 
second", aroused mistrust of Russia and rather negative reaction from the Russian society in the 
opinion of which all sovereigns of the Balkan Peninsula, except for the Montenegro prince Nikolay, 
were included in the category of "false friends" and "double-faced allies", "the ill-wishers who are 
only covered with a friendship mask" [11]. 
This point of view, obviously, was also shared by the Russian government; on a military 
holiday in Peterhof Alexander II publicly declared Prince Nikolay Chernogorsky "the only sincere 
and loyal friend of Russia". These royal words "do not comprise threat, below the slightest 
expression of censure or displeasure", on the contrary, "they only establish the undoubted historic 
fact confirmed by century historical experience" [19]. 
In 1891 big European tour of the king Alexander during which he visited St. Petersburg, 
Moscow and Kiev, and then Vienna and Ishl took place. The "German" party at the St. Petersburg 
court was dissatisfied with the Serbian king Alexander visit to Russia, [20] and Austro-Hungary 
brought down a stream of manuals and morals to Serbia. "Neue Freie Presse" in sharp and 
categorical expressions wrote that Serbians "have to be careful of any aspirations to national 
association and not forget that Zemlin is close to Belgrade", and that the small Kingdom is in 
complete dependence from the Gabsburg empire [21]. 
The official Serbian newspaper "Odjek" placed the answer to these insinuations. "We do not 
see any difference between national independent policy and dream of the great Serbian kingdom". 
Addressing the association of Italy and Germany, the newspaper wrote that "the logic and history 
specify that all national states were formed in such a way. That is why it is impossible to demand 
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from Serbians that they considered dreams of the great Serbian kingdom as utopia … The Serbian 
people deserve it for centuries-old battle for civilization, for the fact that they served so long as a 
bulwark of peace and cultures in Europe" [21]. 
Arguing on the future of the Balkan Peninsula and about its destiny of "separate breeding 
units" the Russian publicists believed that its wellbeing depended not so much on the result of 
rivalry for "influence" on their future of the European states, but on internal unity. 
On April 1, 1893 the young king Alexander made revolution, having declared himself full 
age. "The Serbian revolution" as the Russian contemporaries christened it, caused ambiguous 
reaction of the European states: from complacent (Russia and France) to malicious grumbling 
(Great Britain and Germany). Almost total absence of reliable information made April revolution in 
the opinion of the European and Russian public "the Belgrade riddle". 
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